Inter-relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSP

The question of relationship between the Directive Principles and the Fundamental rights has caused some difficulty, and the judicial attitude has undergone transformation on this question over time.

Initially, the courts adopted a strict and literal legal position in this respect. The Supreme Court adopting the literal interpretative approach to Art. 37 ruled that a Directive Principle could not override a Fundamental right, and that in case of conflict between the two, the Fundamental right would prevail over the Directive Principle.

Champakam Dorairajan case , 1951

The Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, stated—-

1. The Directive Principles should conform, and run as subsidiary, to the Fundamental rights.
2. “The Directive Principles of the state policy, which by Art. 37 are expressly made unenforceable by a court cannot override the provisions found in part III (fundamental rights) which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate writs, orders or directions under article 32.
3. The chapter on fundamental rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any legislative or executive act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in part III.
4. The Directive Principles of state policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental rights.”

DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

The Supreme Court started giving a good deal of value to the Directive principles from a legal point of view and started arguing for harmonizing the two the Fundamental rights and Directive Principles.

Article 31-C & The Directive Principles of State Policy

Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment act, 1971

The first part of article 31-C provides that no law which is intended to give effect to the directive principles contained in Art. 39 (b) and (c) shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14,  19 and 31.

The second part of Art 31-C provided that “no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy can be called in question on the ground that it does not in fact give effect to such policy’’ (invalid).

Kesavananda case, 1973

The Supreme Court held that the first part of Amendment valid in the Kesavananda case. The court emphasized that there is no disharmony between the directive principles and the fundamental rights as they supplement each other in aiming at the same goal of bringing about a social revolution and the establishment of a welfare state, which is envisaged in the preamble. The courts therefore have a responsibility to so interpreting the constitution as to ensure implementation of the directive principles and to harmonize the social objectives underlying therein with individual rights.

In building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be subordinate to directive principles. Economic goals have an uncontestable claim for priority over ideological ones on the ground that excellence comes only after existence. 

Second part of amendment has held invalid on the ground that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and hence, cannot be taken away.

Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment act, 1976

The next step in the direction of giving primacy to all directive principles over the fundamental rights was taken in 1976 when all directive principles were sought to be given precedence over Arts. 14, 19 and 31 by the 42nd amendment. This Amendment further widened the scope of Art.31-C so as to cover all directive principles.

Article 31 (right to property) was abolished by the 44th Amendment Act (1978).

Minerva Mills case, 1980

However, the change incorporated by 42nd Amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd v/s UOI

But the Supreme Court did not uphold this Amendment as constitutional. The main theme of the court’s pronouncement was that the constitution is based on the “bedrock of balance” between the directive principles and fundamental rights and to give absolute primacy to one over the other would disturb this balance. Both can co-exist harmoniously. The goals set out in the directive principles are to be achieved without abrogating the fundamental rights. Both can flourish happily together.

The Court thus restored Article 31c to its original State as inserted by Twenty fifth amendments, 1971.

I.R. Coelho vs State of TN, 2007

Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho v. state of T.N.  argued “by enacting fundamental rights and directive principles which are negative and positive, obligations of then states, the constituent assembly made it the responsibility of the government to adopt a middle path between individual liberty and public good.

Fundamental rights and directive principles have to be balanced. The balanced can be tilted in favour of the public good. The balance, however, cannot be overturned by completely overriding individual liberty. This balance is an essential feature of the constitution.” On the whole, courts have used directive principles not so much to restrict fundamental rights as to expand their scope and content.

CONCLUSION

The goals set out by the Directive Principles have to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided by the Fundamental Rights’. The Parliament can amend the Fundamental Rights for implementing the Directive Principles, so long as the amendment does not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.It may be concluded by saying that, one should try to establish harmony between fundamental rights and Directive Principles, since maintenance of harmony between them is a basic feature to the constitution.